Khrushchev’s Decision Making during the Cuban Missile Crisis
"Khrushchev's Decision Making during the Cuban Missile Crisis" analyzes the Cold War characterizations of Khrushchev's decision making during the Cuban Missile Crisis versus post Cold War characterizations. In doing so, the essay finds that Cold War scholars described Khrushchev's decision making as calculated, reasonable, and justifiable but post Cold War scholars described his decisions as risky. Such differing assessments are likely due to the significantly greater material available to post Cold War scholars; a number of U.S., Soviet and Eastern European sources have been declassified. The USSR side of the Cuban Missile Crisis has continually been neglected and these sources have helped shine a light on this side.
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